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Abstract: A popular and highly politicized theme today is that US workers are falling 
behind as their real wages fall and income gets redistributed to the rich. This article looks at 
some reasons that income inequality could rise, and then explores whether, in fact, workers 
are losing out.  It looks at the suggestion that workers are falling behind relative to the 
wealthy, and at evidence on whether workers real wages have been falling, or perhaps only 
manufacturing wages. It also examines whether there is a growing “wealth gap” and whether 
it is due to falling labor compensation relative to wealth. Finally it examines the hypothesis 
that relatively inexperienced or unskilled workers are falling behind by fixing a skill level and 
seeing how real wages are changing over the recent past.  The evidence here provides a 
perspective on why some analysts might believe that there is rising inequality or an emerging 
wealth gap, or that workers are falling behind, but generally it is not favorable to these 
pessimistic views of how well workers are doing. While inequality may have risen in recent 
decades, and there are strong reasons to think that the evidence for this is weak, there is also 
a strong reason to think that it would be a normal function of an aging population and 
nothing more.  Short of population control or unexplainable and unfair redistribution from the 
old to the young, there may be nothing that can or should be done to reverse the rise in 
inequality.  Finally the paper argues that there is a wealth gap, but it is due to falling real 
interest rates and a decline and not due to declining compensation, either absolutely or 
relative to overall income.   
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Is Inequality Growing as American Workers Fall 
Behind? 
John A. Tatom* 
 
A popular and highly politicized theme today is that US workers are falling behind as their 
real wages fall and income gets redistributed to the rich. Newly-elected Senator Jim Webb 
(2006) has been a leader in espousing this view and the Hamilton Project at the Brookings 
Institution, led by Robert Rubin, Lawrence Summers and Roger Altman, is dedicated to 
the study of this problem.  Fed Chairman Bernanke (2007) recently accepted the thesis that 
there is a rising inequality problem and admonished his audience and readers to be careful 
not to attack inequality with tax increases or trade restrictions that would damage the 
overall economy.    
 
Bernanke’s predecessor, Allan Greenspan, often warned of the seriousness of the rise in 
inequality; for example, in testimony before the Senate Banking Committee in June 2005, 
he said, “As I have often said, this is not the type of thing which a democratic society --a 
capitalist democratic society—can really accept without addressing.”  
Measuring inequality is difficult, however. Existing evidence is not strongly supportive 
that it has increased and there is little consensus on why it might have changed 
 
This article looks at some reasons that income inequality could rise, and then explores 
whether in fact workers are losing out.  In section 3, it looks at the suggestion that workers 
are falling behind relative to the wealthy, and at evidence on whether workers real wages 
have been falling, or perhaps only manufacturing wages.  In the next section it looks at 
whether there is a growing wealth gap and whether it is due to falling labor compensation 
relative to wealth. Finally it examines the hypothesis that relatively inexperienced or 
unskilled workers are falling behind by fixing a skill level and seeing how real wages are 
changing over the recent past.  The evidence here provides a perspective on why some 
analysts might believe that there is rising inequality or an emerging wealth gap, but 
generally it is not favorable to these pessimistic views of how well workers are doing.     
 
I. Why could inequality have risen?  
One of the principal explanations for the popular view that workers are falling behind at 
the expense of the rich capitalists of the country, is another popular view that holds that 
more skilled, more experienced and higher income workers have benefited from rapid 
technological change, boosting their incomes relative to the unskilled, inexperienced low- 
wage workers.1  This explanation directly leads to the number one solution to rising 
inequality, which is to boost the income levels of those who would otherwise be at the 
bottom by attempting to equalize educational outcomes. This has proven very difficult in 
                                                 
*I am grateful for the help of Ozer Erdem for his research support.  
1 The term “capitalists” is used here because of the common distinction in the work on the distribution of 
income and wealth between income from labor and from non-human capital. Here the term refers to 
those who earn income from non-human capital, including profits, dividends, royalties, rents, interest or 
similar returns.  In reality, workers are capitalists too, both in the sense that their earnings are the return 
to human capital and also in the sense that most workers own non-human capital and earn capital 
income.  .   
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recent years as high school drop-out rates have risen, but remains a key link to higher 
income of those otherwise destined to be relatively poor.  Another popular view, certainly 
more questionable, is that rising inequality is due to globalization.  The Economist (2007), 
among many others, takes this view suggests that rising inequality will pressure acceptance 
of future or even past steps to open trade. Bernanke (2007) downplays the possibility, 
arguing that globalization plays a “moderate” role in accounting for inequality and that 
skill-biased technical change has been more important.    
 
A key neglected factor affecting inequality is the aging of the population.  In the US the 
baby boom has caused the median age of the population to rise from about 28 years old to 
about 36 years old today, and it will peak near 38.6 percent in 2040 as the baby boom is 
disappearing as the latest cohort in the US population.  What has this to do with inequality?  
    
If we focus on only two sources of earnings, wage income and income from capital—
profits, dividends, interest or rents, the distribution of income depends upon the 
distribution of ownership of labor and capital resources.  If there were no physical capital 
and all workers were age 20 and had the same basic educational levels, say just starting out 
in life, the sources of income variation would be very small, basically arising from 
differences in basic intelligence, learned skill differences, willingness to participate in the 
labor force or inherited social capital.  There would be relatively little inequality of income 
among this population.  
 
As this group ages, however, the sources of inequality would multiply.  Workers would 
invest in education and skills to different degrees leading to different occupational choices 
and in turn to different paces of wage gain due to industry or occupation specific 
technological change.  Larger wage dispersion among the group would emerge over time.  
Moreover, even if the young group had the same saving rate and inheritance prospects, 
differences in capital ownership and income from capital would emerge because of 
differences in asset allocation, especially risk tolerance and luck and timing.  Moreover, 
they would not have the same saving rates or inheritance levels at every point in time or 
income level, boosting the inequality among them. Attendance at a high school or college 
reunion is sufficient to drive home the point.     
 
If the population ages, inequality will increase as older less equal groups come to dominate 
the population.  Similarly, populations that become younger are likely to have more equal 
incomes, other influences remaining the same.  During the 1950s and 1960s as the 
population became younger, inequality fell, according to many estimates, and not 
surprisingly as the median age began to rise, especially after the baby-boomers had fully 
entered the labor force around 1980, income inequality began to rise.  There may be many 
other factors accounting for rising inequality, but this one is glaring and potentially has 
huge effects on the distribution of income and wealth.   
 
Piketty and Saez (1998) have produced estimates of the inequality from 1913 to 2004 that 
have attracted considerable attention because it they show that inequality has risen back to 
levels last seen in the 1930s. Most famously, both Jim Webb (2006) and Alan Reynolds 
(2006, 2007) have taken up their charge that “the top 1% now takes in an astonishing 16% 
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of national income, up from 8% in 1980,” the former acceptingly and the latter critically. 
Reynolds (2006, 2007) focuses on several problems with the income measure that they use 
to assess growing inequality, including rising income in retirement and other accounts that 
is not taxed until it is distributed. In fact, what is more significant is the fact that the 
growing new savings accounts have removed larger and larger shares of income from 
being reported by low and middle income earners giving rise to the appearance that they 
are getting smaller shares of income, to the benefit of the rich, that more and more business 
income is being shifted to be realized on individual tax returns instead of business tax 
returns and that the use of  reported income for tax purposes excludes transfer payments 
that are relatively more beneficial to the non-rich.  Bernanke does not avoid these problems 
by the use of the distribution of after-tax income, though the larger tax cuts for low-o and 
middle-income taxpayers ameliorates the shift observed by Bernanke, compared with that 
reported by Piketty and Saenz.   
 
Piketty and Saez (2007) responded to Reynolds, but miss his major point that the reported 
income they use has been increasingly biased over time because more and more of income 
is not reported for tax reasons.  One factor that Reynolds notes is the increasing share of 
income that accrues in IRA, 401k programs and other plans that allow income to 
accumulate without taxation. What is even more important is the growing omission of 
income on tax returns because pre-tax income is being invested in various defined 
contribution plans.  Also, neither Piketty and Saenz or Reynolds note that increasing 
amounts of income are now being realized through payments for fringe benefits, especially 
health care insurance, employer contributions for retirement income,  vacations, sick leave 
and other benefits.  These benefits are more equally distributed across income levels.  Thus 
the rise in benefits is giving rise to the appearance that wages and salaries excluding 
benefits are rising much more slowly among lower wage workers, as Bernanke highlights, 
and that higher income workers have disproportionately higher reported income for tax 
purposes. 
 
Focusing only on the employee contributions for health and retirement saving programs, 
especially for example, 401K programs, the largest share of this “unmeasured” income 
accrues to the middle class, giving rise to the appearance of a disappearing middle class 
and a rising share of income among the top income recipients.  In 2006, for example, a 
worker over 50 could contribute a maximum of $20,000 ($15000 for employees under age 
50) to a company-sponsored plan such as a 401K program.  This would reduce the 
measured income from tax reports by 40 percent for a worker earning $50,000 per year, 
but only 10 percent for a worker making $200,000.  For some public employees and 
teachers, the case is even more impressive. They can contribute twice as much as other 
workers resulting in double the understatement of their incomes for estimating shares of 
income.  For the top 1 percent of workers, making over $300,000, the maximum allowable 
contribution would lower their measured income by less than 7 percent. The result is the 
appearance that relatively more measured income is accruing to those at the top. As 
Reynolds points out, other measures of income do not produce such a doubling of the share 
accruing to the top 1 percent, though many experts accept the notion that there is a rise.  
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II. Are workers falling behind?  
Real compensation per hour of workers has been growing very rapidly in this decade, 
contrary to popular opinion.  This should not be surprising because of the unusually rapid 
growth in productivity that is occurring and the fact that real wage gains are tied to 
productivity advances.  Chart 1 shows that manufacturing compensation per hour is also 
rising rapidly compared with the business sector.  The manufacturing data are only 
available since 1987.  
 
Chart 1 
Real compensation per hour is not falling 
 
Manufacturing real wages have risen rapidly since 1997
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Some analysts who think that workers are falling behind focus on manufacturing wages, 
where globalization might have taken its biggest toll on less well-educated and less-
competitive workers.2  This conception of developments in manufacturing could not be 
further from the truth.  Manufacturing real wages have risen at a 3 percent annual rate 
since mid-1997, somewhat faster than in the overall business sector where real wages rose 
at a rapid 2.7 percent pace.  Since the end of 2003, manufacturing real wage growth has 
been slow, but this offsets the 6 percent annual pace of growth in 2002-03. Focusing only 
on the wage argument, manufacturing compensation has been rising faster than consumer 
                                                 
2 Studies by Bhagwati and Kosters (1994), Bhagwati (2004) and by Feenstra, alone and with  and Gordon 
Hanson, discussed in Feenstra (2007), have looked at whether globalization has accounted for declining real 
wages of unskilled workers and concluded that there has been little effect. Feenstra and others focus on the 
distinction between production and non-production workers in manufacturing to assess the effects on workers 
with different skills, assuming that the production workers have less skill.  Another way to look at workers 
with less skill is to use entry level salaries; see section 4. The use of manufacturing workers is attractive 
because this sector is expected to be more affected by trade.  
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prices (measured by the personal consumption expenditure deflator) and actually rising 
faster than in the overall business sector of the economy for almost 10 years.  
 
Manufacturing compensation per hour has been relatively high since 2002.  From 1987 to 
the third quarter of 2001, manufacturing wages fell from over 112% of business sector 
compensation to about 106 percent.  Since then it climbed to over 114 percent at the end of 
2003.  While relative wages fell subsequently, they have been higher in 2004-06 than they 
were in 1996-2001. At their lowest in 2006, manufacturing wages were over 10 percent 
higher than the average level for the business sector, a level achieved in only a few 
quarters from 1987 to 2002.      
 
III. Is there a growing wealth gap?  
Senator Jim Webb and others argue that workers are not keeping up with the wealthy, 
which is a key reason why inequality is rising and workers are falling behind.  They focus 
on the declining share of wages relative to overall wealth, or what they call the “wealth 
gap.”  Chart 2 shows that employee compensation as a percentage of wealth has been 
falling recently, but that it has been falling since the 1970s, except for in the early part of 
this decade (I/2000-III/2002) when the stock market correction boosted the ratio.   
 
Chart 2 
The wealth gap has been growing for almost 30 years 
A decline in compensation relative to wealth, which began in the 1970s, was interupted by the 
stock market correction and recession 
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The chart also indicates why compensation has not kept pace with wealth.  The size of 
compensation relative to wealth can be thought of as the product of two measures, 
compensation as a share of income or GDP, and the size of GDP per dollar of wealth.  This 
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second measure is also shown in Chart 2.  Advocates of the view that labor is falling 
behind suggest that this decline is occurring because labor is getting less, and that 
capitalists are getting more, of each dollar of income.  But in fact it is the shortfall in 
income relative to wealth, not of wages that is the proximate cause of the decline in 
compensation relative to wealth. 
 
The nation’s income has not kept pace with wealth growth according to Chart 2. Moreover, 
movements in GDP relative to wealth account for the entire decline in compensation 
relative to wealth and reflect the decline in real interest rates that has been going on for a 
long time, but especially since early 1995 when both lines in Chart 2 begin a more rapid 
pace of decline.  When the share of wage gap line in Chart 2 is constructed with a constant 
ratio of compensation to GDP, the historical average ratio, the adjusted wealth gap, with 
the unchanged compensation-GDP measure, the adjusted series lies almost exactly on top 
of the actual ratio shown in the solid line of Chart 2.  This means that nearly all of the 
variation in the actual data is due to the movements in GDP per dollar of wealth. This is 
understandable because the only other source of change, compensation as a percent of 
GDP, shows little variation around a constant over time. 
 
The declining ratio of GDP to wealth is essentially the ratio of income to the assets that 
generate that income, thus it is an indicator of the rate of return on the nation’s wealth, or 
the real rate of return on wealth.  It is tied to the real rate of interest.  There can be many 
reasons why this has declined, but a shortfall of compensation is not among them.   
 
Chart 3 makes this clearer.  It shows the share of business sector compensation in total cost 
and national income account measure of the compensation of employees as a percent of 
national income.  The national income measure in the chart includes the government and 
household sectors but excludes some components of benefits and the compensation 
measure from the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) is for employees only.  
The line is included for comparison purposes only, although its compensation measure is 
the same as that used in Chat 1 to show the wealth gap. .   
 
Both lines are relatively stable though the former is more stable, illustrating the well-know 
relative constancy of the share of labor in cost and in the nation’s output and domestic 
income.  Most importantly, there is no significant drop in recent years.  In some periods it 
does appear that there is a statistically significant negative trend, such as when the data set 
ends in mid-1997 or in early 2006, but statistical tests find that the share is “stationary,” or 
tends to gravitate toward its mean for all periods, or when a trend appears that it is 
statistically significant, the share tends to gravitate toward its trend without falling away it.  
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Chart 3 
Labor share in income is not unusually low 
The share of labor compensation remains relatively steady
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Focusing on the business sector measure, it is the case that the labor share matched its 
lowest earlier level in the first quarter of 2006, but it was  no lower that in the comparable 
cyclical period in mid-1997, before wages surged moving the share up quickly to above 
average.  In early 2006, this share at 60.8 percent was not much below the 1947-06 mean 
of 63.7 percent. By the third quarter of 2006 it was 62.4 percent, only one standard 
deviation below the mean.       
 
To be more accurate, the share of labor compensation in GDP implicit in the ratio of 
compensation relative to wealth in Chart 2 is not the same as either of the shares shown in 
Chart 3.  The latter ratio is shown in chart 4. It differs from the share of labor in the 
business sector because of differences in the compensation measure and because of 
movements in the share of the business sector relative to overall GDP.  The share of the 
NIPA measure e of employee compensation in GDP is not a constant, unlike that for the 
business sector, and it also does not have a clear trend. Statistical tests of the stationarity of 
the ratio, that is, whether it fluctuates around a given and fixed mean, a constant, or 
perhaps is trend stationary, fluctuating around a given deterministic trend, show that it is 
neither. Presumably this is the case because the share of the business sector output in GDP 
is not stationary.   
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Chart 4 
The share of NIPA employee compensation in GDP is not unusually low 
The share of employee compensation in GDP is not unusually low
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Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis 
 
 
But the share of employee compensation in GDP also has not fallen unusually in recent 
years, nor is it at historical lows, as some analysts have suggested.  The latest observation 
is 56.4 percent of GDP, down from the most recent peak of 59.0 percent in IV/2000.  The 
lowest ratio shown in the chart was in mid-1948 when the ratio hit 52.2 percent.  So the 
level of compensation has declined 4.4 percent relative to GDP sine the end of 2000, but 
the recent ratio is less than one standard deviation below its 1947-06 mean of 57.2 percent 
(standard deviation equals 1.32%).  Note the ratio was lower in 1997 than it has been 
recently.  Note also that when it was so low, it subsequently surged up beyond its mean, 
just as it has begun to do lately. Again this is not simply the vagaries of the chart; instead it 
is based on standard economic behavior that boosts the demand for labor and wages 
whenever there is a discrepancy between real wagers and productivity.  More importantly, 
fluctuations in the share of compensation in GDP have not played any role in accounting 
for fluctuations in compensation relative to wealth.   
 
While the share of labor compensation has been low recently, it is not unusually low 
relative to its past history and certainly was not so low as to suggest that the hypothesis 
that it is essentially constant has been refuted nor has its low level played a notable role in 
accounting for the decline in compensation relative to wealth.  While there is some 
evidence that the labor share fluctuates around a slight negative trend for some sample 
periods ending after 1996, this would not alter the conclusions that the labor share of 
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income is not unusually low in recent years or that its movements have not shown a 
significant break from past performance. Standard statistical tests show that it fluctuates 
around its mean, or sometimes around a slightly negative trend, with no tendency to drift 
off or fall sharply off from its past behavior. The decline in compensation relative to 
wealth has been fully accounted for by the decline in the real rate of interest in recent 
years, in particular the decline in GDP per unit of wealth.   
 
IV. Have the wages of the least experienced workers fallen?   
Part of the story of the workers falling behind suggests that workers with the least 
education or the least experience are suffering the largest relative decline in real wages.  If 
manufacturing workers are not falling behind, then perhaps it is entry level workers with 
the least skills.  It is difficult to assess the wages of workers with a common level of little 
or no experience.  One such group that is clearly middle class or destined to be so are new 
college graduates and beginning teachers.  They are more homogeneous at least as far as 
their occupational choice where they are the least experienced in their field.  While 
relatively inexperienced, these workers are better educated than the average worker.  
Nonetheless, their wages may provide some insight about wage trends and inequality.  The 
American Federation of Teachers collects information on beginning teacher salaries of new 
college graduates and their non-education major contemporaries.  Chart 5 shows these 
wages adjusted for price movements from 1994 to 2004.  Prices are measure by the 
personal consumption expenditure deflator and wages are expressed in 2004 prices. 
 
Chart 5 
Wages of new teachers and other graduates have not been weak 
College graduate beginning salaries
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Source: American Federation of Teachers  
Both wage series show rising real wages over the period, although wages of non-education 
majors are more cyclical rising more in 1998-2001 and falling in 2002-04.  The real wage 
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of beginning teachers also fell in 2002.  For the whole period, wages of teachers started at 
79.4 percent of non-education majors in 1994 and were little different, at 78.3 percent, in 
2004, the latest data available.  For the full period 1994-2004, wages of non-education 
majors rose at a 1.37 percent annual rate, slightly faster than the 1.23 percent rate for 
beginning teachers.  Both figures are slower than the pace of real compensation growth 
over the same 10-year period in manufacturing (2.41%) or the business sector (2.28%), 
which suggests that relatively inexperienced college graduates may be falling behind 
relative to the average worker.   
 
The comparison could simply reflect the fact that the beginning wage data ignore benefits 
such as health insurance, while the compensation data for manufacturing and the business 
sector do not.  Since benefits are the fastest growing component of compensation, it is not 
clear that beginning wage data show that the less experienced receive lower compensation 
gains.  The employment cost index for manufacturing “wages and salaries only” suggest 
that this is not the reason.  From 1994 to 2004, the employment cost index for wages and 
salaries, deflated by the PCE deflator, in manufacturing rose at a 1.22 percent rate, about 
the same as for teachers and only slightly below the 1.37 percent pace for a group that the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) employment cost index data that benefits rose faster than 
wages and salaries over the period as well, about 0.62 percent to 0.85 percent per year 
faster, depending upon the group.  Thus it would appear that real wages and salaries and 
probably real compensation are growing at about the same pace for beginning teachers and 
other college graduates as for the manufacturing or civilian sectors.  This work result 
should be taken only as suggestive, but it is certainly not consistent with the notion that the 
least experienced workers are falling behind more experienced workers.   
 
V. Conclusion 
There are many reasons why inequality could have risen in recent years, but perhaps the 
most neglected one is the aging of the US population. Older workers have more diversity 
in education, experience, accumulated wealth and income from wealth than young people.  
Not surprisingly, indicators of inequality of retraced its decline following World War II 
when the population became younger, as the median age rose.  But measures of inequality 
are suspect in themselves, and certainly overstate the rise in inequality since the 1980s.  
This is because most measures of income that are used to assess distributional shares 
exclude the large share of income that lower and especially middle income workers are 
able to save as before tax income.  Moreover, the income from these assets is also not 
included in assessing the distribution of income.  Similarly, health insurance and other 
benefits, which are distributed more equally across income levels at most firms have 
dominated compensation trends in recent years making comparisons of reported taxable or 
after-tax income biased in favor of observing rising inequality.   
 
One of the most widely used measures that suggest that rising inequality is occurring due 
to workers falling behind is the wealth gap, or the declining ratio of compensation to 
wealth. Compensation has fallen recently relative to wealth, supporting the claim that there 
is a growing wealth gap.  Except for a brief period associated with the stock market 
correction, recession and recovery from early 2000 to mid-2002, however, the ratio of 
compensation to wealth has been for several decades.  Indeed, it has been falling since the 
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mid-1970s and fell especially sharply in the late-1990s and again since 2002.  IN mod-
2006, the latest available data, compensation was 5.2 percent higher than it had been in 
mid-1997, its previous low.   
 
Not only is the behavior of compensation relative to wealth not a new phenomenon, it does 
not merit being called a “wealth gap,” at least not in the sense that it shows that workers 
are somehow losing out to the wealthy.  The share of compensation in income is 
remarkably stable in the US economy.  Thus the share going to labor fluctuates slightly but 
remains close to its average; more importantly, it has a tendency to return to its average so 
that when the share is low, wages tend to grow faster than productivity pulling the share 
back toward its mean, and when wages are relatively high compared with productivity, 
wage growth slows pulling the share back down toward its mean. In recent years the labor 
share has been a little low, so, not surprisingly, wage growth is accelerating and the share 
is rising, much as occurred after mid-1997, the last time the labor share of income was a 
little low relative to its mean.  
 
A declining compensation-wealth ration also does not imply that real wages are falling.  
The evidence here show that wages overall and in manufacturing have shown stellar 
advances over the past seven years.  Declining manufacturing wages, feared by some, have 
not occurred.  Another theme, that rising inequality has occurred because the least 
experienced or educated workers have fallen behind, also does not get support from the 
data here. Beginning wages for teachers and non-education college graduates, two groups 
with little or no experience in their chosen fiends have mover up and done so for 1994-
2004 at the same pace as earnings in manufacturing or the business sector as a whole.   
 
The only meaningful driver of the wealth gap, the share of compensation on wealth, is 
overall income relative to the nation’s wealth, or the ratio of GDP to wealth. This is a 
rough indicator of the rate of return to capital in the economy.  This ratio has been 
declining for many years and accounts for the wealth gap.  Since the ratio of GDP to 
wealth is closely tied to the real rate of interest, one can conclude that tit is the decline in 
the real rate of interest that accounts for the so-called wealth gap, not some weakness in 
compensation.  Just as any weakness in compensation might suggest serious social 
problems and public policy issues, so too with the decline in the real interest rate. 
 
Another argument that purports to show that income of capitalists is rising relative to 
workers is the boom in corporate profits since end of the recession.  Corporate profit shave 
climbed to over 12 percent of GDP, a level not seen since occasional peaks from 1950 to 
1965.  But that issue has already been addressed, at least implicitly. The constancy of the 
share of labor, or the fact that its small decline since 2000 did not reduce it to unusually 
low levels, imply that the share of capital did not rise unusually either.  Remember that 
corporate profits are not the only return to capital.  Lower interest income and rental 
income relative to GDP have offset the rise in the return on equity (as a percent of GDP).  
Moreover, lower real interest rates, in this case, on corporate debt, have played a role in 
redistributing income from creditors to owners of corporations. The net result has been 
little change in the share of income to capital.   
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A low real interest rate also explains why stock and other asset prices are relatively high, 
but it would also mean that the cost today of promised future retirement benefits represent 
a much larger cost today that we might have expected in the past, both for the businesses 
and the governments that made them.  It also means that accumulating wealth to use in our 
retirement years, especially to make up for a current shortfall, will be much more difficult 
because the same saving effort will be met with much smaller returns that might have been 
the case in the  past.  Either way—weak compensation, or weak returns to capital—some 
individuals are losing out relative to past expectations.  And either way it is important to 
know why and with what effect, before dashing off to develop a public policy aimed at 
correcting any perceived problem. But most of all, it matters whether we have found the 
culprit in falling wages or whether the problem is the exact opposite of what it appears to 
be, at least to some.     
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